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The battle for independence in Lebanon

By Dr. Edmond Melhem

 

The acts of the French authorities in the Lebanese Republic, especially in 1943, led to a revolt driven by a feeling of national solidarity and aimed at ending French rule and achieving complete independence. As Shereen Khairallah puts it, “in 1943 a feeling of national solidarity had developed, for a common cause was being fought: independence.”[1] The SSNP, Wade Goria asserts, “played an active role in supporting the independence movement in 1943.”[2] The Syrian Social Nationalists were among the groups that participated in the popular revolt for the independence of Lebanon. Sa’id Fakhr al-Din, an SSNP member, was among those nationalists who fell while attacking French tanks in the Bshamoun battle. The Social Nationalists, it will be shown later, played a role within the fortress of Rashayya, where the President of the Lebanese Republic and some Cabinet members were imprisoned. Before highlighting the role of Social Nationalists and their contributions to the battle for Lebanese independence, a short review of the developments leading to the popular revolt of 1943 is presented in the following.

 

Under the French mandate, Greater Lebanon had two parallel governments: one French headed by a High Commissioner, and one Lebanese appointed by the former and entrusted with the responsibility of carrying out the routine of internal politics as long as it did not interfere with French interests. When the State of Greater Lebanon was replaced by the Lebanese Republic with a new constitution, the basic structure of the government remained the same, but the French High Commissioner was replaced by a President. The modifications were partial and in essence Lebanon was still under mandate and its government controlled by a special administrative body, the Services Speciaux.

 

Between 1926 and 1943, the Lebanese demanded on a continuous basis greater autonomy and the French were always unyielding. Zealous French officials provoked conflicts with the Lebanese on many occasions. One such occasion was in 1932 when they opposed the election by Parliament of a Muslim candidate, Muhammad al-Jisr, as President. The High Commissioner, August Ponsot, believed that a Muslim should not be chosen for the presidency of the Lebanese Republic although there was nothing in the Lebanese Constitution preventing a Muslim from being the Chief Executive.[3] As the American Consul General in Beirut, H. S. Coold, reported to the Secretary of State in Washington:

 

The Syrian constitution expressly provides that the President of the Republic shall be a Muslim. Now, if the Lebanon were presided over by a [Muslim] at the very time when the new [Muslim] Republic just over the hills was getting into its stride, there might be an undue attraction on the smaller coastal State. The French are not anxious for this. [4]

 

In an arbitrary action, the High Commissioner suspended the constitution and dismissed the Parliament. The same action was repeated in 1939, the year of a world-wide economic depression. Encouraged by the outbreak of hostilities, France opted to tighten its authority over Lebanon. It declared the country in a state of siege, suspended the constitution, dissolved the Parliament and applied wartime restrictions and censorship decrees. Furthermore, it abrogated the Franco-Lebanese treaty signed in 1936, which promised Lebanon full independence by 1939. [5]

 

Ultimately, the French came to realize that the Lebanese would not accept their mandatory control. In June 1941, a force of British and Free French troops invaded Syria and Lebanon from Palestine. Their aim was to control the mandated territories, in which the Vichy French had established their authority after France fell to the Germans, and reverse “the grim prospect of being outflanked by pro-German regimes in Iraq as well as in Syria and Lebanon.”[6]An Allied aircraft dropped leaflets proclaiming the independence of Syria and Lebanon in the name of Free France. With the completion of the entry into Lebanon of the Allied troops, General Georges Catroux was appointed by General Charles de Gaulle to be the “Delegate and Plenipotentiary of the Chief of the Free French for the states of the Levant”. On November 26, 1941, Catroux issued a Proclamation in which he announced his Government’s intention to grant Syria and Lebanon independence after the war.

 

In spite of the declaration of independence, the Free French refused to implement their independence promises. Their attitude gave the impression that they were far more interested in perpetuating their presence in the Levant. Finally, after a long delay, it was agreed that elections would take place in Lebanon as a step towards the restoration of parliamentary life and the transfer to the native government of services hitherto directed and controlled by the French. [7]

 

The elections took place in the summer of 1943. They resulted in a victory for the Constitutional Bloc of Bishara al-Khuri over the National Bloc of Emile Eddé. The latter was known for his alliance with the French[8], whereas Bishara al-Khuri was known for his anti-French platform and backed by the British. He stood for Maronite-Sunni co-operation in the interest of gaining complete independence. [9]

 

Maronite-Sunni co-operation manifested itself in the new Lebanese regime of Bishara al-Khuri who was elected President of the Republic on September 21, 1943, and Riyad al-Sulh who was appointed Prime Minister. Their new government declared the principles of the ‘National Pact’, outlined in the first chapter. It also declared that Lebanese independence should be achieved through the revision of the Constitution of 1926 and the abrogation of all articles in it referring to France as a mandatory power.

 

The modification of the constitution was strongly opposed by the French. [10] When the Lebanese Government embarked on this task, the French Delegate-General, Jean Helleu, reacted by ordering French and Senegalese troops to arrest the President, Prime Minister and other members of the cabinet. Consequently, al-Khuri, al-Sulh, Camille Sham’un, Salim Takla, Adel Osseiran, and Abdul Hamid Karami were all arrested. As reported in a telegram, dated November 11, 1943, from the US Consul in Beirut to the Secretary of State in Washington, “ French marines and Senegalese troops broke brutally into their houses.” [11] The US Consul reported also that “one Minister had resisted and been brutally beaten”.[12] Simultaneously Helleu suspended the constitution, dissolved the Parliament and appointed Emile Eddé as a President of the Republic.

 

Two cabinet ministers, Vice President Abi Chahla, and Defence Minister al-Amir Magid Arslan, escaped arrest. They fled to Bshamoun, where they declared themselves the legal authorities and carried on the business of Government while the arrested Cabinet members and the President were imprisoned at the fortress of Rashayya in Wadi al Taym in eastern Lebanon.

 

The Lebanese people reacted swiftly to the French actions. Strikes and demonstrations were organized throughout Lebanon and riots erupted in some places. Religious and political leaders as well as representatives of doctors, lawyers, engineers and journalists visited the British and US Legations demanding intervention, illustrating the unanimity of the anti-French protest. [13]

 

Finally, as a result of diplomatic pressure from Britain, supported by the United States and the Arab States, France was forced to reverse its policy and release the internees.[14] The latter were reinstated in their positions. Their release symbolised the beginning of the end of French rule in Lebanon. This beginning was followed by lengthy negotiations between the Lebanese government and the French. The end came in 1946 when the French left the area and Lebanon was said to have gained its political, administrative and military independence.

 

[1]Shereen Khairallah, This is Lebanon, Beirut: Khayats, 1965, p. 79.

 

[2]Wade R. Goria, Sovereignty and Leadership in Lebanon 1943-1976, London: Ithaca Press London, 1985, p. 33.

 

[3] The first President of Greater Lebanon, Charles Dabbas, a Greek Orthodox, was elected in 1926. When the question of presidential election arose in 1932, the Maronites and the Sunnis were reluctant to see the highest office become the fief of a minority community such as the Greek Orthodox community. They both demanded the Presidency for their communities and its exculsion of the minorities. The division of the Maronite community into two rival clans, one headed by Emile Eddé, a trusted ally of the French, and the other headed by Bishara al-Khuri, was so intense that parliamentary action could have led to the election of a Muslim candidate: Muhammad al-Jisr. In his anxiety to prevent a Muslim from becoming President and in anticipation of the problems arising from this eventuality, the High Commissioner chose to suspend the Constitution. See Pierre Rondot, “The Political Institutions of Lebanese Democracy”, in Leonard Binder (ed.), Politics in Lebanon, New York: John Wiley & Sons, inc., 1966, pp. 136-137.

 

[4]Walter L. Browne, The Political History of Lebanon, 1920-1950, Vol. I, U.S.A.: Documentary Publications, 1976 , p. 149.

 

[5]Shereen Khairallah, op. cit., p. 74.

 

[6]Wade R. Goria, op. cit., p. 24.

 

[7]Shereen Khairallah, op. cit., p. 76.

 

[8]In 1929, he was appointed as Prime Minister. During the 1930s, he continued to argue, as Wade Goria affirmed, “that Lebanon’s best hope for a secure and stable future rested in its being a permanent French protectorate”. See Goria, op. cit., p. 20.

 

[9]W. Goria, ibid., p. 24.

 

[10]The French insisted that their responsibilities, as a mandatory power, could only be terminated with the approval of the League of Nations. They also insisted on negotiating a treaty which would safeguard their cultural, economic and strategic interests in the area. After concluding such a treaty, then they would relingquish the special prerogatives they enjoyed. See George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, fourth edition, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980), p. 325.

 

[11]Walter L. Browne, op. cit., p. 436.

 

[12]Ibid.

 

[13]Walter L. Browne, op. cit., p. 442.

 

[14]Shereen Khairallah, op. cit., p. 78.