__________________________________________________________
The
Sanjak
of
Alexandretta:
A Forgotten Syrian Territory
Published
in Al-Zawba’ah: Issue 9; vol. 2; November 1998
(by Dr. E. Melhem)
The Geography of Alexandretta
Alexandretta (Iskandaroun) covers an area of
4.805 square kilometres of the Levant coast
along the Eastern Mediterranean. It is located
in the Western section of what is known as the
"Syrian Saddle." Its port (the port of
Alexandretta) is said to be "the first natural
harbour in the Eastern Mediterranean."1
It offers safe anchorage for large ships in a
gulf over 35 miles in length. Furthermore, it is
"the natural outlet for the vast hinterland of
Aleppo and the Upper Euphrates valley and is
connected by rail with Osmanich and thus with
the main lines running west to Ankara and
Istanbul, east to Baghdad, and south, through
Aleppo, Damascus and Haifa, to the Suez Canal."2
Within the boundaries of the sanjak of
Alexandretta, however, lie, in addition to the
port of Alexandretta, the ancient historical
town of Antioch (Antakya) that has become the
sanjak's capital; the fertile valley of
the Orontes; and the southern section of the
Amanus Range.
The History of Alexandretta
Historically, the city of Alexandretta was
founded by Alexander the Great to commemorate
his victory over Darius III at Issus in 333 B.C.
It was built on a coastal strip of sand and
shingle about 1/2 a mile wide near the
Phoenician town of Myriandrus. It was designed
as a great caravan centre, but was soon
surpassed in that respect by Antioch.
In the third century A.D. the Persians destroyed
it, but Wathiq, a grandson of Harun al-Rashid,
rebuilt it in the ninth century. Its history is
best summarized in an article written by Syjak
Adam in 1937. "At Alexandretta," Adam wrote,
"the winds whisper, not of Celtic Saint and
highland Chieftain, but of Alexandretta of
Macedon, and the fierce feuds of Roman and
Persian, Egyptian and Seleucid, Byzantine and
Arab, Turk and Armenian, not to mention the
Prophet Jonah, spewed ashore hereabouts from the
whale's belly. Old as ages, and wild and savage
is the history of the land."3
The Economy of Alexandretta
Economically, Alexandretta is seen as a trade
outlet. Its port is excellent and its natural
hinterland far-flung and potentially rich. The
potentialities of its sea fishing are also
considerable. Moreover, "the trade of the
southern section of the Jazira, the districts of
Mosul and the two Zabs, of Bitlis and Lake Von,
and the Rowanduz Iran trade would all naturally
flow to Alexandretta via Beylon rather than to
Tripoli."4 Alexandretta and its
potential importance was described in a British
document in 1937 as a "mercantile port which
could serve an extensive belt of
territory sitting astride the Turkish-Syrian
frontier eastwards into northern Iraq and
north-west Persia, or as a possible naval base."5
The Strategic Importance of Alexandretta
Strategically, it is said that whoever controls
the port of Alexandretta, the southern Amonus
range and the Pass of Beylon leading to the
plain of Aleppo, "acquires a dominating position
at a key-point in Asia Minor."6 This
importance, moreover, has been stressed by many
writers. For instance, the Arabic paper
al-Muqattam
reported in 1938 that the Beylon Pass was
absolutely essential for defending Turkey.7
The latter was involved in Alexandretta, the
paper pointed out, not for the sake of a Turkish
community, but for acquiring a strategic hold on
the region, i.e., through possession of the
Beylon Pass. This position was considered
important for Turkey because it would facilitate
the process of defending that part of the
country in South Anatolia. Moreover, if Turkey
controlled it, not many troops would be needed
to defend the country on this front. The paper
added that throughout all the stages of history,
the Beylon Pass was considered strategically
important for both Anatolia and Syria.
For his part, Antun Sa'adeh, the leader of the
Syrian Social Nationalist Party,
highlighted the strategic importance of
Alexandretta for Syria. To him, there are
certain positions on the borders that must be
kept under the Syrian Army's control, otherwise
the entire country will be exposed to the danger
of conquest, colonization and humiliation.8
Sa'adeh asserted that the area known as "The
Cilician Gates" must necessarily remain under
Syrian sovereignty, not only for the security of
the Attna-Maash and Alexandretta-Aleppo regions,
but for the security of the entire country as
well.9
It might be claimed that because traces of oil
had been found at Alexandretta,10 or
possibly because of its strategic importance and
its potentiality as a trade outlet, Turkey
disputed with France over this part of Syria.
Whatever the decisive reasons, Alexandretta, at
present, is considered strategically and
commercially important due to considerable
improvements that have been made to its port
facilities and along its shore, as well as due
to "its choice as a military centre and Turkish
naval base on the Mediterranean."11
Turkey Exploits France's Weakness
The Turkish government annexed Alexandretta in
1939, when Syria was under the French mandate.
France was in a difficult situation due to the
deteriorating international situation. Her main
concern at the time was her own security in
Europe and in the Eastern Mediterranean where
she was facing the Italian menace. Turkey, on
the other hand, was in a better situation than
was France. She was advantaged by her strategic
position and diplomatic strength resulting from
her sovereignty over the Dardanelle Straits
since the Montreux Convention of 1936.
Recognizing the opportunity to exploit the
dangerous international situation, Turkey began
to exert pressure on France. She claimed that
the Turkish element constituted the "vast
majority" in Alexandretta and demanded a series
of concessions in this
sanjak
until in July, 1939, France agreed to cede the
territory to Turkey. In this context, Avedis
Sanjian commented on France's political and
military weakness and the factors which prompted
her to cede Alexandretta. He wrote:
Containment of the Axis in Europe and guarantees
for the security of the Dardanelles were more
urgent requirements for her own security than
the 'expendable' sanjak of
Alexandretta. It was certainly this basic
conflict in France's obligations at home and
abroad which was so carefully exploited by
Turkey.12
Franco-Turkish Compromise
For two years France negotiated with Turkey,
using political and military expediency
alongside delicate diplomacy. Finally, a
settlement was reached between the two countries
ending their dispute over Alexandretta. The
Franco-Turkish settlement enabled France to
"maintain and even to strengthen and extend her
relations with Turkey, the 'Guardian of the
Straits' since 1936."13 As far as
Britain was concerned, the compromise between
France and Turkey was received "with relief as
ending a dispute between two important friends
and allies at a time when serious dangers were
pressing from other quarters."14
To Syria, the loss of Alexandretta occurred at a
time when she was weak and under the control of
the Mandate. The cession took place in disregard
of her rights and interests and against the
wishes of the non-Turkish majority of
Alexandretta.
An Illegal and Immoral Act
Juridically, the Franco-Turkish compromise
violated a number of international agreements
governing Alexandretta. One such agreement was
the Charter of the Mandate itself, which
stipulated that: "the Mandatory [France] shall
be responsible for seeing that no part of the
territory of Syria and Lebanon is ceded or
leased or in any way placed under the control of
a foreign Power (Art. 4)."15
Other agreements included:
a) the "Franklin-Bouillon Agreement," signed in
Ankara between France and Turkey on October 20,
1921, which guaranteed a special administrative
regime for this Syrian territory;
b) the Convenant of The League of Nations
(article 22);
c) the "de Jouvenel Agreement" signed between
France and Turkey on May 30, 1926;
d) the Treaty of Lausanne; and the decisions of
the League Council of 1937, "which had
reaffirmed the
sanjak's
distinct status within the Syrian political
framework."16
France, as an international jurist, remarked M.
Georges Scelle, "committed an illegal act, by
disposing of terrritory in which she had not a
free hand."17 By the same token,
Patrick Seale pointed out that "by disregarding
its pledge to protect the integrity of Syria,
France had committed a flagrantly immoral
political act."18
In short, just as Great Brtain, by virtue of the
Balfour Declaration, sacrificed in 1917 a part
of southern Syria (Palestine), to return a
favour to the Zionists, similarly did France
sacrifice a part of northern Syria
(Alexandretta), in order to appease Turkey.
[1] Avedis K. Sanjian, "The Sanjak of
Alexandretta (Hatay): Its Impact on
Turkish-Syrian Relations (1939-1956),"
Middle
East Journal,
vol. 10 (4), 1956, p. 379.
[2]
Arnold Toynbee, "The Hatay (Autonomous Sanjak of
Alexandretta),"
Documents on International Affairs,
1937,
p. 465.
[3] Syjak Adam, "The Charm of Alexandretta,"
Great
Britain and
the East,
vol. XLVIII, January 28, 1937.
[4] Syjak Adam, "The Importance of
Alexandretta,"
Great Britain and the East,
vol. XLV III January 21, 1937, p. 82.
[5] J.
G. Wood, "Franco-Turkish Dispute over the Sanjak
of Alexandretta,"
British Documents on Foreign Affairs,
Part
2, June 1936-June, 1938, Document No. 156, p.
237.
[6] Arnold Toynbee, op. cit., p. 465.
[7] Al-Muqattam, 24 June 1938, "Will the
Turks Occupy Alexandretta?"
[8] Antun Sa'adeh,
al-Muhadarat al-Ashr
(The
Ten Lectures),
Beirut: SSNP, 1976, p. 93.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Kenneth Williams, "Turkey's dispute with
France over Syria,"
Great
Britain and the East,
December 17, 1936, p. 880.
[11] Encyclopaedia Britannica, vol. 6, p.
409.
[12] Avedis K. Sanjian, op. cit., p. 381.
[13] Arnold Toynbee,
op.
cit.,
p.381.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Avedis K. Sanjian, op. cit., p. 382.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Quoted in
ibid.
[18]
Patrick Seale,
Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East,
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988,
p. 28
